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Main findings
• Generalised decline (or stagnation) of incomes in absolute (real) 
terms. 
• Relative stability of the MC in terms of income and wealth but 
probable churning and reshuffling within the various sub-classes, 
with the LMC faring worse (Sliding down vs. polarization)
• The worsening position of the MC is more evident in terms of 
income security and long-term occupational stability than in terms 
of wealth. MCs’ discontent is connected more to the declining 
opportunities of their children than to their parents’ relative 
income/wealth. 
• With the opportunities for their offspring becoming  ever less 
favourable, each segment of the MCs has operated a defensive 
closure, which led to a sharp decrease in social mobility, even 
between its various segments within our broad definition of the MC.
Definition and databse
• Middle-income groups are internally highly heterogeneous. 
Their size depends on how they are defined, whether by 
income, wealth, occupation, education, environment, social 
network, manners or values. 
• We use the historical archive of the Bank of Italy’s Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which gathers 
homogeneous and harmonized information on the income, 
wealth, savings and consumption of Italian households for the 
period 1977–2012.
• We adopt the commonly agreed definition of the middle-
income class as formed by those families with equivalent 
disposable income between 60 per cent and 200 per cent of 
median income.

Inequality has increased, driven by what happened at
the bottom of the distribution
The 1991 divide. Shrinking or churning? 
Population share by income 
class
Income share by income 
class
Polarization?
• The ‘shrinkage’ in the middle class could be due to an increase in both the 
lower and the upper part of the distribution, leading to a spreading away 
from the median and consequently to a rise in polarization. 
• Atkinson and Brandolini (2011) do not find signs of income polarization in 
Italy up to 2004. 
• Petrarca and Ricciuti (2015) compare polarization in six European countries 
(the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, Italy, France and Spain), and find 
that polarization increased in all the countries except Italy (data available 
until 2010), with the effect of the middle class getting poorer exceeding that 
of the middle class getting richer. 
• We compare the income density functions for 1991, 2006 and 2012. Our 
findings suggest that the central part of the distribution, after the economic 
crisis, moved toward lower rather than higher income ranges, while the 
increased distance between the two modes could be a sign of polarization.
• These results are confirmed by the Foster–Wolfson 
polarization index, a synthetic index of bipolarization which is 
consistent with the polarization curves and similar to the Gini 
index: we find a similar degree of polarization between 1991 
and 2006 (from 0.25 to 0.248) (although it shows anincrease 
in-between) and an increase thereafter (in 2012 the index 
reaches the value of 0.274).
Foster and Wolfson bipolarization index, Italy, 1977–
2012
• In conclusion, it seems that, after the start of the economic 
crisis, we can detect the first signs of polarization and thus of a 
declining middle class. If the economic and fiscal crisis 
persists, the reshuffling is likely to continue, with households 
at the top of the distribution upgrading their position and 
households at the bottom losing ground. 
• A range of not mutually exclusive causes have been 
mentioned: technical change leading to the polarization of 
skills and jobs, the effects of the fiscal crisis on public 
employment (wage freeze and precarious jobs) and welfare, 
the more severe effects of the economic crisis on the lower-
middle class, institutional and economic factors favouring an 
increase in top-labour income, and labour reforms penalizing 
young cohorts independent of their class of origin.
Labour reforms: intergenerational inequality
Before the crisis: 
flexibilisation at the margin and increase in labour
market dualisation and segmentation
Since the crisis:
-Liberalization of fixed-terms contracts (Fornero’s
Law and Renzi’ Jobs Act)
-Abolition of art. 18 of Workers’ Charter of Rights
-Introduction of a progressive right to tenure (3 
years) +
-heavy subsidization of firms hiring unemployed
people on  an open-ended contract (problem of 
additionality of jobs)
Three problems concerning youth:
1. Unemployed
Unemployment rate of 15-24 years-old: from 20% in 
2007 to 43% in 2015.
2. Precarious
Flows out of non-standard contracts for young people 15-34 
years of age, Italy, first quarter 2007–first quarter 2013
3. Poorer: 
OLS Estimates of gross annual earnings by birth
cohort (Naticchioni et al, 2014)
all Tertiary educated
«Social generations»
• Berloffa et al. (2015) compare the transition between the occupational 
status of two different educational cohorts: those individuals who finished 
education between 1971 and 1985, and those who finished after 1992. The 
results show that for the second cohort (the cohort hit by the effects of the 
labour market reforms enacted since the end of the 1990s) there is a 
significant increase in the probability of being trapped in a non-standard, 
and thus insecure, form of employment.
• Chauvel (2013): status societies. Countries differ in their capacity for 
inclusion (if only in terms of market participation). 
• Conservative and Mediterranean welfare regimes, + Japan, provide an 
institutional context that favours the emergence of deeply contrasted 
cohorts with diverging social paths and life chances. 
• More resilient societies, where second chances exist (in terms of education 
or work opportunities), have less cohort-based inequality: Nordic countries 
and English-speaking ‘liberal’ countries, where new social or market 
opportunities over the life course can lessen, at least partially, difficulties in 
early adulthood
Implications
• Widening difference between the average income of young 
and old people (LM and WS effects). 
• Increasing difference between different cohorts
• MC’s offspring do not appear to have fared better (tertiary 
educated)
• Consequences
• Increasing reliance on parents’ support, delayed family 
formation and falling fertility  inequality feeds on itself
Total net wealth by income groups, Italy, 
1987–2012
Families’ responses
Family background can influence employment and earnings (besides 
affecting “unobservable abilities”)
i) through the probability of higher educational attainment; 
educational attainment increases from the bottom to the 
upper class, moreover.. 
Increasing differentiation in education (private university, study
abroad, post-doc stages) 
• ii) through the greater probability of getting a good job 
networks of social contacts;
a “closed shop” effect (Bison 2013): children’s probability to 
have a job in the same sub-class of origin when first entering 
the labour market. Supported by licensing of occupations. 
Contradiction between the sweeping process of deregulation of the 
labour market and the resistance that has been opposed to any 
attempt at liberalization of the professions (notary, accountants, 
pharmacist, taxi drivers.
Intergenerational mobility among occupational
groups, Italy 2011 (EU-SILC)
Parental occupation Managers Professionals
Associate 
professionals, 
technicians, 
clerks
Service and 
sales workers
Blue-collar 
workers 
Parents’ 
distribution
Managers 9,44 22,84 31,78 14,74 21,2 7,24
Professionals 3,82 40,04 32,02 9,41 14,71 7,61
Associate 
professionals 
technicians & clerks
2,98 18,03 45,01 12,4 21,59 17,55
Service workers 2,97 10,78 28,63 30,13 27,49 9,9
Blue-collar workers 2,27 7,43 23,3 17 50 57,71
Offspring’s distribution 3,1 13,22 28,92 16,75 38,02 100
Offspring occupation
Intergenerational mobility   
• A high level of intergenerational persistence of occupation.
• All the occupational groups (but the managers): a higher 
proportion remains in the same occupational group of their 
parents. 
• The persistence is particularly high for the blue collars, who 
have 50% of probability of staying in the same occupation of 
their parents. 
• Occupation persistence is also high among professional and 
associate professionals, possibly linked to the entry barriers 
that still limit the access to certain professions.
Summary findings: class vs inter-
generational conflict
• Given two decades of slow growth and the deepest recession
since the war, de-regulation of the LM has not increased the 
number and quality of jobs but has induced a downward
equalization across classes
• MC children: reduced employment and security
• Limited role of education: upskilling is no solution if demand for 
skills does not increase
However
• Retrenchment (glass ceilings and parachute effects) 
becomes more evident when the crisis reduces the 
opportunities and the availability of good jobs. 
• Social mobility sharply decreasing.
